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Abstract
The rapid development and deployment of vehicle technologies offer opportunities to re-
think intersection operations. This paper capitalizes on vehicle connectivity and proposes a co-
operative framework for allocating priority at intersections. Similar to free markets, our frame-
work allows vehicles to trade their time based on their (disclosed) value of time. We design the
framework based on transferable utility games, where winners (time buyers) pay losers (time
sellers) in each game. Our cooperative framework is compatible with a variety of existing con-
trol methods, it drives travelers to estimate their value of time correctly, and naturally dissuades
travelers from attempting to cheat.
Keywords: Intersection operations; cooperative games; connected vehicles; value of time
(VOT); transferable utility; side payment.
1 Introduction
Intersection are the bottlenecks of a city’s traffic net-
work. The interaction between multiple conflicting
streams of traffic at intersections presents safety, ef-
ficiency, and environmental challenges. To address
these challenges, intersection controllers schedule
the priorities of different traffic streams in a way
that optimizes one or more operational metrics. In
this context, compared to a traditional vehicle (TV)
environment, a system consisting of connected ve-
hicles (CVs) can collect and utilize more detailed
data and exchange information between vehicles ef-
ficiently. This creates opportunities to rethink the
way intersections are controlled.
Efficient operation is sometimes achieved by ac-
counting for heterogeneity in the vehicle popula-
tion, e.g., different vehicle classes have different ca-
pacity conversion factors [52]. Control tools should
take this into account when efficiency is sought.
Similarly, priority can vary depending on whether
a vehicle is on a major street or minor street at
an intersection. To promote transit, one priori-
tizes vehicles with larger numbers of passengers
and distinguished vehicles by trip purpose, e.g.,
high-occupancy vehicle lanes and bus-only lanes
[17, 22, 29, 46, 47]. Considering different travel time
requirements, toll lanes are designed to allow pay-
ing vehicles to go faster. But such toll lanes are usu-
ally expensive [14] and they typically do not apply
tiered pricing for different travelers because of lim-
ited lane resources.
Equipped with a mobile wireless communication
device, a CV is able to communicate with adja-
cent CVs, infrastructure (V2I), and even the Internet
quickly and frequently. This allows for exchange of
information about the number of passengers, trip
purpose, and value of time (VOT). Control tools, in
turn, can use such rich information to schedule ve-
hicles through the intersection in ways that account
for the heterogeneous characteristics of the vehicles,
e.g., transit signal priority in a CV environment [29].
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Table 1: Intersection optimization for CVs
Objective Index Reference
Efficiency
Delay, travel time
and travel speed
Transit signal progression for CVs [29]; optimized discharge
sequences [28, 68]; CACC [74, 75]; multi-scale perimeter
control [69]; adaptive phases [31]; multi-agent scheduling
[32]; cumulative travel time responsive [37]; bi-level
optimization with adaptive phases [19]; combined trajectory
and signal timing [42]; reservation with first come first
served [15, 16, 61]; cooperative games [73]; correlated
equilibrium [1]; Cournot and Stackelberg games [9];
coalitions and dynamical control [8]
Queue size Bi-level optimization and adaptive phases [19];
VOT valuated
delay or travel time
Reservation-based intersection control [63]; intersection
auctions for AVs [10, 39]; ∆-tolling scheme for network
control [58]
Efficiency +
comfort
Number of stops
and acceleration
Optimized discharge sequences [28, 68]; deceleration
optimization with cooperation [27]; non-cooperative games
(chicken game formation) with Nash equilibrium [18]
Combined index
Rolling-horizon with optimization of delays + stops +
deceleration [23]
Environment Fuel consumption
Trajectory optimization/eco-CACC [33, 53]; Bolza-type
optimal control [41]; decentralized coordination [71]
Safety Collision avoidance
Cooperative vehicle intersections [36, 38]; priority rules,
uncontrolled intersections [45];
Efficiency + Safety
+ Environment
Combined index
Variable speed limit control with optimization of travel time
+ time to collision + fuel consumption [35];
Inspired by toll lanes, research has emerged on
tolling intersections for CVs, e.g., auction-based in-
tersection operations. When passing an “auction-
required” intersection, vehicles need to auction
their passing rights with others from conflicting
traffic streams based on their valuated delay or
travel time [10, 39, 63]. Tiered pricing can also be
indirectly realized.
In practice, the real bidders in such auctions
should be computer programs, because travelers
cannot react fast enough when facing different pos-
sible passing sequences. But in order to represent
the travelers, vehicles will need to be knowledge-
able of the travelers’ VOT (what they are willing
to pay for unit time saving). As VOTs vary from
person to person and from trip to trip, it can only
be evaluated by the travelers themselves. Conse-
quently, the programs cannot know whether the
announced VOT is true or not. Considering inter-
sections as queuing systems, vehicles in the same
stream have a common benefit to some degree. When
a vehicle tries to substantially underestimate its
own VOT, the other vehicles in the same queue will
indirectly pay for it to pass. With a large probabil-
ity, the vehicle can also pass the intersection with a
much lower payment and a small (but acceptable)
delay. Over a long period, it would seem that such
an auction encourages vehicles to underestimate
VOT as other vehicles catch on to the scheme. Fur-
thermore, such intersections cannot deal with the
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Table 2: Intersection Control Approaches that Use Game Theory
Index Vehicle Types Reference
Delay
Fully CAV Cooperative games [73]; correlated equilibria [1]
Fully CV
Cournot and Stackelberg [9]; Coalition game with dynamical
control [8]
Travel time (indirectly) TV
Cournot and Stackelberg for user equilibrium and Monopoly
games for system optimal [12]
Queues TV
Nash and Stackelberbg equilibria [3]; continuous Markov
games with Nash equilibria [11]
Acceleration Fully CAV
Non-cooperative game (chicken game) with Nash
equilibrium [18]
– TV
Nash non-cooperative and Stackelberg games [20]; chicken
game for Nash equilibrium (best response) [70]
non-participants, if regulation allows them to not
participate in the auction. This transaction system
will degrade rapidly due to the asymmetric infor-
mation about VOT, which is similar Akerlof’s mar-
ket for “lemons” [2].
This paper proposes a new cooperative frame-
work for allocating priority at intersections. Vehi-
cles with heterogeneous VOTs can engage in trad-
ing priority for direct monetary compensation, i.e.,
they can sell or buy time from the others. We de-
sign a game framework that is based on transfer-
able utility (TU) games to operate the system. Vehi-
cles need only provide their VOT information to the
system at the time of participation in the game. This
facilitates quick and simple transactions, which is
needed in the context of real-time intersection op-
erations. The proposed framework is compatible
with existing control techniques and can, therefore,
be viewed as a complementary framework, one that
is meant to improve upon aspects of existing control
frameworks, not compete with them.
This paper extends our previous work on trans-
ferable utility games for intersection control [43] in
the following ways: 1) We outline that three pop-
ular control methods that are compatible with our
game framework. 2) We apply our game frame-
work to more complex intersection layouts in our
experiments. 3) We further explore the feasibility
that travelers defraud our game framework in one
of our experiments. The next section reviews rele-
vant literature, namely VOT and intersection con-
trol, mainly for a CV environment. The following
section outlines the proposed approach and how
it can be incorporated with some existing control
methods. This is followed by simulation experi-
ments, and the last section concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Intersection Control for Connected Vehicles
Researchers have proposed various optimization
objectives to improve intersection performance for
CVs. Delay minimization is the most widely ap-
plied objective in intersection control [1, 8, 9, 15,
16, 19, 23, 28, 29, 32, 42, 61, 68, 69, 73], and it
can be simply calculated as the difference between
real-speed travel time and free-flow-speed travel
time. Moreover, minimizing personal delay can be
seen as an implicit objective for reservation-based
systems, such as first-in-first-out systems [15, 61].
Other papers minimized travel time or maximized
travel speed, which are (in essence) equivalent to
minimizing delay [31, 37, 58, 72].
Other recent approaches focus on minimizing
queue sizes [3, 11, 19]. Both traditional actuated
control techniques and recent decentralized control
approaches can be seen as falling in this category
as well [24–26, 40, 54, 62, 66, 67]. Fuel consump-
tion is also a common optimization index [33, 41,
53, 71], which combines environmental considera-
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tions with economic efficiency and resource utiliza-
tion. When considering both efficiency and com-
fort, number-of-stops or acceleration/deceleration
are useful indices [18, 27, 28, 68]. Other approaches
have focused on safety, e.g., Lu et al. [45] set
collision-avoidance as the goal and performed field
tests using a rule-based control algorithm. Other re-
searchers applied multi-objective techniques for in-
tersection optimization [23, 35].
2.2 Value of Time (VOT)
The approaches above all treat vehicles as homoge-
neous units. VOT serves as measure of heterogene-
ity among the vehicles at an intersection. It cap-
tures what different drivers are willing to pay for
for travel time savings and has been investigated
for more than half a century [5, 6, 48, 65]. In the past
20 years, studies of VOT were specialized to differ-
ent parts of the world such as Japan [34], California
[7], The United Kingdom [64], Germany [13], Den-
mark [21] and Europe in general [59]. Also, Jara-
Daz and Small et al. reviewed models for VOT in
their books [30, 60].
Recent papers have used VOT weighted de-
lay for intersection control. Specifically, Vasirani
and Sascha [63] and Carlino et al. [10] applied
reservation-based intersection control models and
Levin and Stephen [39] used tile-based reserva-
tion to simulate network dynamic assignment un-
der user equilibrium and Schepperle and Klemens
[56, 57] used valuated delay for intersection opera-
tions.
Papers of intersection optimization with different
indices are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 sum-
marizes intersection approaches that use game the-
ory. We also refer to [55] for a recent survey.
3 TU-based Intersection Operation
3.1 Transferable Utility (TU) Game Framework
The control algorithm applies a cooperative game
theory framework using a TU game similar to [44].
We describe this next.
3.1.1 The TU game and side payments
Consider an intersection game between two con-
flicting vehicle groupsA and B. We will envisageA
and B as two players. The payoff to A is Amn when
action (m, n) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, 2} is chosen. Similarly,
Bmn is the payoff to vehicle group B when action
(m, n) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, 2} is chosen. Here, we assume
that action m = 1 is preferred by vehicle group A
and n = 1 to be preferred by B, while m = 2 and
n = 2 are the “disliked” actions byA and B, respec-
tively. We define
A ≡
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
and B ≡
[
B11 B12
B21 B22
]
(1)
as the payoff matrices toA and B, respectively. The
TU game is a cooperative game, which allows side
payment from one player to another.
The feasible set for this TU game is the convex
hull of the points (Amn − σ, Bmn + σ), where σ ∈ R
denotes the side payment. We adopt the conven-
tion that σ > 0 corresponds to a side payment made
from A to B while σ < 0 represents a side payment
made from B to A. Let ωmn denote the total payoff
that can be achieved by players A and B under ac-
tion (m, n), that is, ωmn = (Amn − σ) + (Bmn + σ) =
Amn + Bmn. Hence, in the presence of side pay-
ment, rationality dictates that the action chosen is
that which maximizes the total payoff:
(m∗, n∗) = arg max
(m,n)∈{1,2}×{1,2}
(
Am,n + Bm,n
)
. (2)
Denote the maximal payoff by ω∗, then
ω∗ ≡ Am∗n∗ + Bm∗n∗ . (3)
In the absence of agreement, A and B chose mixed
strategies that ensure guaranteed payoffs indepen-
dent of the other player’s strategy. This is known
as the threat strategy. Let p ≡ [p 1 − p]> denote
A’s threat strategy and let q ≡ [q 1− q]> denote
B’s threat strategy. Here p is the probability that
A chooses their preferred action m = 1 and q is
the probability that B chooses their preferred action
n = 1. It follows that the expected payoff received
by A under their threat strategy is SA ≡ p>Aq and
B’s expected payoff under their threat strategy is
SB ≡ p>Bq.
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The solution to the TU game is one such that A
accepts no less than SA in expected payoff and B
accepts no less than SB . This defines two extreme
points along the pareto-optimal frontier with payoff
pairs (SA,ω∗ − SA) and (ω∗ − SB , SB). Any con-
vex combination of these two points is a TU solu-
tion and, particularly, the midway point constitutes
a natural compromise [49]. The resulting payoff is
1
2 (ω
∗ + SA − SB) to A and 12 (ω∗ − SA + SB) to B.
Hence,
Am∗n∗ − σ = ω
∗ + SA − SB
2
(4)
so that the side payment from A to B is given by
σ =
−ω∗ − SA + SB
2
+ Am∗n∗ . (5)
Similarly, our analysis implies that
Bm∗n∗ + σ =
ω∗ − SA + SB
2
(6)
so that
σ =
ω∗ − SA + SB
2
− Bm∗n∗ . (7)
Subtracting (5) from (7), we get
0 = ω∗ − Am∗n∗ − Bm∗n∗ . (8)
which is true by definition, see (3). This demon-
strates consistency and provides justification for
choosing the midway point (the natural compro-
mise) solution to the TU game.
3.1.2 Threat strategy
To determine the threat strategies of A and B, first
note that since their average payoffs are 12 (ω
∗ +
SA − SB) to A and 12 (ω∗ − SA + SB) to B, we have
that A is naturally incentivized to select a threat
strategy that maximizes SA − SB while B seeks to
minimize SA − SB . Since,
SA − SB = p>Aq− p>Bq = p>(A− B)q, (9)
finding the threat strategy can be described as a
zero sum game with payoff matrix A − B. If a
saddle-point exists, the threat point corresponds
to the saddle-point: the (m, n) pair for which
maxm minn(Amn− Bmn) = minn maxm(Amn− Bmn).
Otherwise, the solution is simply an optimal two-
person zero-sum game mixed strategy. In this
game, A selects their strategy, p, in a way that they
are guaranteed the same (expected) payoff regard-
less of whether B chooses n = 1 or n = 2. Simi-
larly, B selects a strategy that guarantees the same
(expected) payoff regardless of whether A chooses
m = 1 or m = 2. As such, A chooses a strategy p
that renders B indifferent between choosing n = 1
or n = 2. Under p, player B’s expected utility given
n = 1 (i.e., given they choose n = 1 with probability
q = 1) is
[p 1− p]
[
B11 − A11 B12 − A12
B21 − A21 A22 − A22
] [
1
0
]
=
(
(B11 − A11)− (B21 − A21)
)
p + B21 − A21. (10)
Their expected utility given n = 2 (i.e, when q = 0)
is
[p 1− p]
[
B11 − A11 B12 − A12
B21 − A21 B22 − A22
] [
0
1
]
=
(
(B12 − A12)− (B22 − A22)
)
p + B22 − A22. (11)
For player B to be indifferent between between
these two choices, playerA’s threat strategy should
render (10) and (11) equal. We get,
p =
1
Z
(
A22 − B22 − A21 + B21
)
. (12)
where Z ≡ A11 − B11 + A22 − B22 − A12 + B12 −
A21 + B21.
Similarly, player B chooses their threat strategy q
in such a way that player A is indifferent between
m = 1 and m = 2. Under q, player A’s expected
utility from given m = 1 is
[1 0]
[
A11 − B11 A12 − B12
A21 − B21 A22 − B22
] [
q
1− q
]
=
(
(A11 − B11)− (A12 − B12)
)
q + A12 − B12 (13)
and player A’s expected utility given m = 2 is
[0 1]
[
A11 − B11 A12 − B12
A21 − B21 A22 − B22
] [
q
1− q
]
=
(
(A21 − B21)− (A22 − B22)
)
q + A22 − B22. (14)
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For player A to be indifferent between choosing
m = 1 or m = 2, player B’s threat strategy should
render (13) and (14) equal. Hence,
q =
1
Z
(
A22 − B22 − A12 + B12
)
. (15)
The threat point follows immediately. In instances
where the solutions (12) or (15) would return neg-
ative values, one may resort to the linear pro-
gramming solution of the zero-sum mixed strategy
game. Specifically, letting C ≡ A − B denote the
payoff matrix, one solves
q = arg min
0≤x≤1
max
{
(C11 − C12)x + C12
, (C21 − C22)x + C22
}
(16)
using linear programming techniques. It is well
known that the dual problem produces the solution
p for player A.
3.2 Vehicle Grouping and Payoff Formulation
3.2.1 Vehicle groups
We generally group vehicles in accordance with
whether there exists opportunities to improve
travel time through the intersection. We also allow
for vehicles not to be involved in the intersection
game. We simply set the VOT for these vehicles to
zero.
Suppose there are n vehicles along the inbound
links at the intersection (all approaches) at time t,
and they are ordered in ascending order of arrival
times, {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let time t marks an instant at
which the signal controller updates its strategy. The
update cadence can be uniform (e.g., every 10 sec-
onds), triggered by a vehicle arrival (via commu-
nication between the vehicle and the controller), or
a sensor actuation. We denote by S(t) the control
strategy at time t, prior to the update and denote
the new strategy by S∗(t). Let tt,v denote the dis-
charge time of vehicle v ∈ {1, . . . , n} according to
strategy S(t) and denote the associated vehicle dis-
charge vector by T(t) ≡ [tt,1 . . . tt,n]>. Similarly, the
discharge vector under the updated control strategy
is denoted by T∗(t) ≡ [t∗t,1 . . . t∗t,n]>.
Define the time difference vector ∆Tt ≡ Tt − T∗t ,
which will include non-negative elements and non-
positive elements (due to possible re-ordering of ve-
hicles in the discharge sequence). Let ∆τt,v denote
the travel time gain of vehicle v at time t; in other
words, ∆τt,v is the element of the vector ∆T(t) cor-
responding to vehicle v: ∆T(t) = [∆τt,v . . .∆τt,n]>.
We define the sets A and B in accordance with
whether their travel times improve (payers) or
worsen (payees), respectively. We also explicitly ex-
clude vehicles in the system that are not part of the
game. The latter are assumed to have zero VOT. Let
Υv denote the VOT of vehicle v, then
A ≡ {v : Υv∆τt,v > 0} (17)
and
B ≡ {v : Υv∆τt,v < 0}. (18)
Note that A∩B = ∅. Fig. 1 illustrates how the two
groups are selected. The discharge times of the ve-
hicles are enclosed in brackets. Under the old con-
trol strategy in Fig. 1 (a), the eastbound through
and left-turning vehicles are discharged first, fol-
lowed by the westbound left-turning vehicles. Af-
ter the control update, the control strategy shown
in Fig. 1 (b), where the eastbound and westbound
left-turning vehicles are discharged first, followed
by the eastbound through vehicles. For this up-
date, there are two vehicles whose discharge times
decrease (red), and two vehicles whose discharge
times increase (green).
3.2.2 Modeling Payoffs
We define the gains to vehicle groups A and B as-
sociated with the updated strategy S∗(t) as
GA = ∑
v∈A
Υv∆τt,v (19)
and
GB = ∑
v∈B
Υv∆τt,v, (20)
respectively. Note that GA > 0 and GB < 0.
As such, group A prefers the new control strategy
S∗(t), while group B prefers the prior control strat-
egy, S(t).
Following the definitions in Section 3.1, we
have the action pairs (S∗(t),S(t)), (S∗(t),S∗(t)),
(S(t),S(t)), and (S(t),S∗(t)). We use the gains
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(a) Discharge times under S(t)
(b) Discharge times under S∗(t)
Figure 1: Example vehicle grouping, groupA in red
and group B in green.
defined above as the payoffs to the vehicle groups
when there is no conflict. The action pairs
(S∗(t),S(t)) and (S(t),S∗(t)) correspond to con-
flicts. In these two cases, we assume that a con-
troller breaks the conflict by applying a random-
ized strategy: it selects S∗(t) with probability 0.5
and S(t) with probability 0.5. Then, the expected
payoffs for (m, n) = (S∗(t),S(t)) and (m, n) =
(S(t),S∗(t)) are set to zero and we have that
A ≡
[
0 GA/2
−GA/2 0
]
(21)
and
B ≡
[
0 GB/2
−GB/2 0
]
. (22)
Hence,
A− B = 1
2
[
0 GA − GB
−GA + GB 0
]
. (23)
For this matrix, it can be immediately demonstrated
that a saddle-point exists, since maxm minn(Amn −
Bmn) = minn maxm(Amn − Bmn) = 0, and the
threat-point is the action pair (m, n) = (1, 1).
3.2.3 Allocation of side payment
The total side payment from A to B, σ, is immedi-
ately calculated using (5) (or (7)). The side payment
is divided between the vehicles in the game in pro-
portion to their gains. Let σv denote the side pay-
ment made by vehicle v. Then,
σv =

1
GAΥv∆τt,vσ, if v ∈ A−1
GBΥv∆τt,vσ, if v ∈ B
0, if v 6∈ A ∪ B
. (24)
According to (24), if σ > 0, every vehicle in A
makes a positive side payment, and every vehicle
in B “makes” a negative side payment (i.e., receives
a payment). If σ < 0, payments are made from ve-
hicles in B to vehicles in A.
3.3 Control Strategy
The proposed TU game framework can be com-
bined with various control strategies. In this sec-
tion, we show how the proposed framework can
be combined with three existing control techniques,
a phase switching method and a reservation-based
control strategy (for isolated intersections), and a
max-weight based approach for a network-wide de-
centralized controller.
3.3.1 Phase Switching
Without loss of generality, consider the example in-
tersection layout in Fig. 2, which is an isolated
three-lane four-leg intersection with four through
movements and four left-turning movements. For
this intersection there are only eight possible move-
ment combination, which are illustrated by the
phasing schemes shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 2: A typical three-lane four-lag intersection.
Figure 3: A typical phasing scheme for a three-lane
four-lag intersection.
To ensure that all movements are serviced, the
eight phases can be divided into two signal con-
trol groups: a signal cycle that includes phases 1
- 4 and a signal cycle that includes phases 5 - 8.
The phases can be sequenced in numerous ways
for each of these two cycles. The sequences can be
pre-set, based on sensor actuation, or an adaptive
controller. Suppose the cycle length is fixed and let
P = {pi1, . . . ,pi|P|} denote the set of permutations
of phases that constitute a cycle, where pii repre-
sents one such sequence of phases (of pre-defined
length). The departure times and the travel time
gains also depend on the phase sequence, pi. To cap-
ture this, we write the travel time gains as functions
of pi: ∆τt,v(pi). At decision time t, the control strat-
egy is simply one that selects a phase sequence as
follows:
S∗(t) = arg max
pi∈P
n
∑
v=1
Υv∆τt,v(pi). (25)
This can be interpreted as a control strategy which
maximizes the VOT-weighted travel time gains of
all vehicles in the systems. The strategy covers an
entire cycle, but the updates can take place on a
finer cadence, e.g., the control strategy can be re-
evaluated at the end of each individual phase or
even after a pre-set minimum green time. This is
similar to a control strategy with a rolling horizon.
3.3.2 Reservation-Based Control
A reservation-based control system optimizes indi-
vidual vehicle discharge times (and trajectories in
the case of AVs). The control updates are carried out
every time a new vehicle enters the system. Sup-
pose there are n vehicles along the inbound links at
the intersection (all approaches), and a new vehicle
enters the system at time t. Here, S(t) is the op-
timized control strategy prior to the arrival of new
vehicle with the new vehicle processed last in the
sequence, that is, it is assigned the index n + 1 and
the discharge times are T(t) = [tt,1 · · · tt,n tt,n+1]>.
The updated strategy S∗(t) is one that selects a
discharge sequence of the n+ 1 vehicles which max-
imizes the total VOT-weighted travel time gains.
Let P(n + 1) ⊆ 2n+1 denote the set of admissi-
ble permutations of the n + 1 vehicles. By admis-
sible, we mean to preclude sequences that involve
impossible over-taking (for example). Similar to
the phase switching control example above, the up-
dated strategy can be chosen as follows:
S∗(t) = arg max
ν∈P(n+1)
n
∑
v=1
Υv∆τt,v(ν), (26)
where we have emphasized dependence of the
travel time gains on the chosen permutation.
The overall control process for both the phase
switching control and the reservation-based control
methods described above can be summarized by
the flowchart given in Fig. 4.
Note that neither of these two methods scales to
large networks computationally. Computing opti-
mal strategies is only possible if these control tech-
niques are applied in a decentralized way. This
motivates the next control strategy, which is decen-
tralized but comes with network-wide performance
guarantees.
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Determine S∗(t) and T∗(t)
Is S∗(t)
better
than S(t)?
Determine groups
A (payers)
and B (payees)
A and B play
a TU game to
determine σ
Yes
Wait until next
update time
No
Figure 4: Flow chart of the TU game-based in-
tersection operation with phase switching and
reservation-based control.
3.3.3 Max-Weight Control
This approach can be seen as a generalization of the
phase switching approach described above. In this
example, the updated strategy represents the next
phase to select at each intersection in the network.
Let L and J denote the sets of network links and
network junctions, respectively. With slight nota-
tion abuse, let Pj = {pi ji} denote the set of phases
that can be selected at junction j, Mj the set of
movements across junction j, and M the set of all
network movements. Each phase pi ji consists of a
set of non-conflicting movements inMj.
Let Qa,b(t) denote the size of the vehicle queue
along link a that is destined to link b and consider
the Lyapunov function
L(t,pi) ≡ 1
2 ∑
(a,b)∈M
[wa,b(t,pi j)]+Qa,b(t)2, (27)
where [·]+ ≡ max{0, ·}, pi = [pi1 · · ·pi j · · ·pi|J |] is a
vector of junction phases, and wa,b(t,pi j) is a move-
ment weight. Let Va,b(t) denote the set of vehicles
in the queue at link a destined to link b at time t,
then the movement weights are calculated as
wa,b(t,pi j) = ∑
v∈Va,b(t)
Υv∆τt,v(pi j). (28)
Let φa,b(t,pi j) denote the vehicle flux from link a to
link b if phase pi j is active and define the weight
Wa,b(pi j) ≡
[
wa,b(t,pi j)Qa,b(t)
− ∑
c:(b,c)∈M
wb,c(t,pi j)rb,cQb,c(t)
]+
, (29)
where rb,c is the fraction of vehicles in link b that are
destined to link c. Finally, the max-weight decen-
tralized control strategy is given, for each j ∈ J , by
S∗j (t) = arg max
pi j∈Pj
∑
(a,b)∈Mj
Wa,b(pi j)φa,b(t,pi j), (30)
where S∗j (t) is the updated strategy for junction j. It
can be demonstrated analytically that ensures traf-
fic stability at the network level by applying Lya-
punov drift techniques [50, 51], using the Lyapunov
function (27).
4 Numerical Experiments
4.1 Performance Tests
To test the proposed approach, we perform sim-
ulation experiments on a hypothetical three-lane
four-leg intersection (shown in Fig. 2). We use
the reservation-based control method in this exper-
iment. The minimum time headway for vehicles is
set to 1.8 seconds and we use a log-normal distribu-
tion to generate vehicle VOTs. We assume a mean
VOT of 14.1Euro/h [4] and a standard deviation of
9Euro/h. The cumulative distribution function of
VOTs is shown in Fig. 5.
Vehicle inter-arrival times in our experiment fol-
low a negative exponential distribution with dif-
ferent rates for different experiments. For experi-
ments with large arrival rates, we allow vehicles to
queue outside of the intersection; such vehicles are
not considered in the control calculations (they are
treated as being outside of the system from the con-
troller’s perspective).
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of VOT.
To analyze the performance of the proposed tech-
nique, we utilize a “benefit” metric denoted βv.
We benchmark against a first-come-first-serve plan:
Define the time saved by vehicle v as their travel time
under a first-come-first-serve plan less their travel
time using the proposed approach. Denote the time
saved by vehicle v by τsv ∈ R. Vehicle v’s benefit is
given by
βv = τ
s
vΥv − σv. (31)
We also define another metric based on delay,
which we refer to as loss. Denote by λv the loss to
vehicle v. This is given by
λv = τ
d
v Υv + σv, (32)
where τdv ≥ 0 is vehicle v’s delay, defined here as
their travel time less their free-flow (unobstructed)
travel time.
Fig. 6 shows two contour plots of benefit with
varying VOTs and intersection volumes. Fig. 6(a)
shows the benefits obtained (to all vehicles in the
system) in low volume traffic (from 0 to 1200
veh/h), and Fig. 6(b) illustrates the benefits ob-
tained in high-volume traffic (1200 to 2400 veh/h).
In general, all vehicles can benefit from payment
game on average. When VOT is higher, the benefit
is larger; and when the traffic volumes increase, the
benefits increase rapidly.
We next compare our results with two
reservation-based approaches that do not con-
sider VOT or side payments, the first minimizes
total delay and the second applies a first-come-first-
served service discipline. The results are depicted
in Fig. 7. The figure illustrates the competitiveness
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Figure 6: Contour plots of benefit.
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Figure 7: Comparison of three control strategies un-
der varying average volumes.
of the proposed approach as it outperforms the
other two strategies in terms of mean loss, λv,
averaged over all vehicles in the system.
4.2 Impact of Untruthful VOT Reporting
If a vehicle reports a false VOT (while others report
true VOTs), the benefit (or loss) can change. The
change in benefit as a result of this “marginal” dis-
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honest reporting is given by
∆βv ≡ βrv − βv
= [τs,falsev − τs,honestv ]Υv − [σfalsev − σhonestv ], (33)
where βrv represents benefit with false VOT report-
ing, τs,falsev is the time saved with false reporting,
τs,honestv is the time saved with honest reporting,
σfalsev is the side payment made under false report-
ing, and σhonestv is the side payment that is made un-
der honest reporting. Fig. 8 is a contour plot of ∆βv
values associated with the different combinations of
true VOT and declared VOT, when the average traf-
fic volume is 1200 veh/h.
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Figure 8: Additional benefit after untruthful report-
ing of VOT.
The figure shows that the zero additional bene-
fit lies along the diagonal. This corresponds to the
case where vehicles are truthful. As we move away
from the diagonal line, the benefit differences tend
to be negative, which indicates that untruthfulness
in VOT reporting should be dis-incentivized in the
proposed framework.
Next, consider the same experiment but without
side payments. The net benefits, ∆βv, in this case
are depicted in Fig. 9. The results suggest that there
is always an incentive to exaggerate one’s VOT. We
see that basing priority on VOT but prohibiting side
payments results in poor performance overall espe-
cially when the real VOTs get higher.
4.3 ‘Gaming’ the System
In this experiment we simulate the following sce-
nario: a vehicle that stops at an intersection ap-
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Figure 9: Additional benefit after untruthful report-
ing of VOT (without transaction).
proach and collects payments in exchange for pro-
viding priority to vehicles in an opposing approach
thereby blocking their approach. The question is:
how much income can this vehicle earn from such a
strategy?
In order to make the example more realistic, we
set each movement to have two lanes so that one
stopped vehicle will not block the approach com-
pletely. As shown in Fig. 10, the black vehicle
stops and blocks its lane, and its following vehi-
cles need to change lanes to pass. We only take two
movements and choose phase switching control in
this toy sample. Vehicles in the blocked lane have
higher headways and lower throughputs (less op-
portunity to change lane and pass) than their neigh-
bors.
Figure 10: ’Gaming’ the system to generate income.
The results, shown in Fig. 11, illustrate a frustrat-
ing situation for the vehicle. We tested two scenar-
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Figure 11: Total income (per-hour) of the obstruct-
ing vehicle.
ios, a low traffic volume scenario (400 veh/hr/lane)
and a high volume scenario (800 veh/hr/lane). We
see that the total income (payments received less
payments made) in both cases is negative. More-
over, we see that this loss increases with VOT. This
analysis does not include time, only the net side
payments. The primary reason for this is that play-
ing the game is voluntary but if one chooses to play
there is always a chance that they win and will
hence be required to make a payment. In essence,
the stopped vehicle delays the whole movement,
which results in an accumulation of vehicles along
the approach creating an asymmetry at the intersec-
tion. This, in turn, results in the obstructing vehi-
cle’s approach winning the game more frequently.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a new cooperative games
framework for intersection traffic management that
allows vehicles to trade their time directly with each
other. The proposed framework is compatible with
and complements a variety of existing intersection
control methods. The intersection optimizes total
payoffs and divides vehicles into winners, losers
and indifferent-groups based on their value of time
weighted time-savings. Winners pay losers to gain
priority.
In addition to being complementary to exist-
ing intersection control approaches, the proposed
mechanism was designed with two novel aspects in
mind: first, we believe that auction based schemes
have the main drawback that losers are not com-
pensated and, therefore, passengers with lower val-
ues of time have little incentive to participate in
such systems. Second, we believe that the proposed
mechanism is robust to adversarial behavior as il-
lustrated in the second example above. However,
we can only conjecture that this is true in general.
The purpose of this article is to present the mecha-
nism. In a future paper, we will provide a through
analysis of these features of the proposed system.
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